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NOTES
ly for school purposes, a large number of courts have observed that they
are mere agencies of the state, established for the sole purpose of ad-
ministering without profit the state system of public education.11 2 Several
courts have pointed out that, as to tort liability, schools and school cities
occupy a status different from that of municipal corporations, which
ordinarily have a dual character and which may exercise proprietary as
well as governmental functions."0 3 Some courts, however, have held
schools liable for their torts. In Thomas v. Broadlands Community
Consol. School Dist.,'"° the Illinois court held that a school would be
liable where it had purchased liability insurance, even though no statute
authorized insurance and the function giving rise to injury was govern-
mental. The same result has been reached in Kentucky and Tennessee.'
Schools have also been held liable for injuries arising from defects on
the premises under the "safe place" statutes even though the act did not
specifically mention schools.0 6 The courts in the British Empire appar-
ently do not recognize the doctrine of immunity with respect to local
educational authorities in charge of public schools. In respect to their
liability in tort, they have generally been treated as private persons or
corporations.0 7 Since the only good reason ever advanced for sustaining
complete immunity for schools is the protection of the public funds, again,
insurance appears to be the best solution.' If insurance is present to
protect the public funds, the reason for immunity disappears.
AN INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT SEEKS AN APPEAL
C*... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' These familiar words are extracted from
Section 1, Article Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States.
The Fourteenth Amendment is a statement of rights-a source of justice
102. Rhoades v. School Dist., 115 Mont. 352, 142 P.2d 810 (1943).
103. See Annot., 160 A.L.R. 58, n. 10 (1943).
104. 338 I1. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
105. See note 96 supra.
106. See Annot., 114 A.L.R. 428 (1937).
107. See cases cited at 160 A.L.R. 84, n. 14 (1943).
108. See Annot., 160 A.L.R. 1 (1943).
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. § 1.
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for the citizen of this land. Though the words are plain, their meaning
at times is abstruse; the resultant effect is manifested by a constant
struggle within our citizenry attempting to crystallize their elusive import.
A segment of this struggle is concerned with the rights of an indigent
criminal defendant. The indigent on appeal has made material gains in
recent years, and a recent United States Supreme Court decision seems
to be in line with this liberalized attitude toward the indigent criminal
appellant. In McCrary v. State of Indiana2 the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that there may be a flaw in the interpretation of the
Indiana Public Defender Act as viewed in the light of Griffin v. Illinois.3
John Clifford McCrary is a prisoner at a state penitentiary in
Indiana. He sought the aid of the Indiana Public Defender to effect an
appeal of his conviction. Apparently the Public Defender felt his case
lacked merit, and therefore refused to aid the prisoner. Mr. McCrary
then filed a transcript pro se with the Indiana Supreme Court. The court
dismissed the appeal because of violations of the Indiana Supreme Court
Rules regarding form and content of the transcript.4 He then filed a
petition with the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis-both were granted.'
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the petition of the
prisoner which alleged that (1) he sought the aid of the Indiana Public
Defender-a person empowered by state statute to secure the preparation
of a transcript in paupers' cases-but the Public Defender refused to
assist him, and that (2) the dismissal by the Indiana Supreme Court
denied him the equal protection of the laws because he was and is unable
to pay for the preparation of a transcript. In a per curiam decision, the
Court vacated the order of dismissal by the Indiana Supreme Court and
remanded the case.6 The basis reported for this decision was that the
record before the United States Supreme Court did not disclose whether
the petitioner's allegations were made to, and passed on by, the Indiana
Supreme Court in light of the Griffin case.
This decision may come as quite a surprise to those who have always
considered Indiana a leader among the states in providing aid to indigent
appellants. Though it may be a surprise, a careful study of the law in-
2. 364 U.S. 277 (1960).
3. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In this case, the United States Supreme Court held that
an indigent criminal appellant must be provided with a free transcript where the
transcript is essential to take an appeal. "Destitute defendants must be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts."
Id. at 19.
4. State ex rel. McCrary v. State, 158 N.E.2d 292 (Ind. 1959).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Ibid.
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terpreting the Indiana Public Defender Act may well reveal that certain
adjustments may be necessary. To understand these problems fully,
knowledge of the entire Indiana system of aid to indigent criminal
appellants would appear essential.
THE INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDENT ON APPEAL IN INDIANA
The indigent on appeal is concerned with financial problems which
also beset a non-indigent on appeal, the difference being that the non-
indigent is financially able to nullify these problems. Basically, the cost
of appeals, which is the major problem in this area, can be broken down
into three general categories:
1. Cost of trial transcript.
2. Cost of counsel fees.
3. Cost of filing fees, bonds, etc.
Considering these cost areas one at a time, what is Indiana's position
in this problem of giving aid to indigents on appeal?
TRANSCRIPT
In 1854 the court in Falkenburgh v. Jones8 held that a poor person
appealing a conviction was entitled to a transcript of the trial record
without cost. The indigent here was convicted of grand larceny.
A misdemeanor case in 1872 found the court achieving the same
result as in the Falkenburgh case. In State ex rel. Morris v. Wallace,9
the court predicated its result on interpretation of the criminal code' and
some intriguing analogies to wit:
It is not questioned but that the officers of the court are bound
to perform their duties for the defendant, and that witnesses for
him are bound to attend upon his summons, without pay there-
for, up to the time of his conviction. We can see no reason why
his right to a transcript of the record upon an appeal to this
court, without such payment, is not a right of equal importance
and equally well secured to him." (Emphasis added.)
7. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 13-1401 to 13-1406 (Burns 1956).
8. 5 Ind. 296 (1854).
9. 41 Ind. 445 (1872).
10. Id. at 446.
11. Id. at 447-448. The court made an interesting statement in regard costs. "If
the defendant be compelled to pay costs for a transcript, or for any other service
rendered by any officer or any witness, and the judgment of conviction should be reversed
in this court, and the defendant ultimately acquitted, he can never recover the amount
back or be reimbursed in any way known to the law." (Id. at 447-8). This type of
statement would indicate that the State should assume costs in all criminal cases-both
at trial and appellate stage-or else provide a means for recompense to the acquitted
party.
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These cases show that the problem of free transcripts for indigents
on appeal was decided early in Indiana history in favor of the indigent.
An ancillary problem subsequently arose, however, concerning whether
the Supreme Court could mandate the trial court to supply defendant
with a transcript. This was decided against the alleged indigent in
Merrick v. The State," where the court rested its decision on a matter
of trial court discretion. "These are questions depending upon the
circumstances of the party, and resting within the sound judicial discre-
tion of the court, and we must presume, nothing appearing to the
contrary, that the discretion was properly exercised."" A subsequent
case'4 followed the decision in the Merrick case on the same type of
question. However a later case, State ex rel. Pappas v. Baker, Judge,"
indicated that mandamus would lie if there was a showing by the peti-
tioner that the transcript, if furnished, would enable him to present
questions on the merits which he could not otherwise present on appeal.
This condition imposed by the court was not set out in the legislature's
enactment in 1893.16 The proviso in this statute refers merely to whether
or not the petitioner is a poor person. Nevertheless, the Indiana court in
a recent case'7 followed the doctrine that a mandate would lie to order
12. 63 Ind. 327 (1878).
13. Id. at 355.
14. In re Morgan, 122 Ind. 428, 23 N.E. 863 (1890). This case also involved the
appointment of counsel on appeal. Court reasoned that though the defendant was pro-
vided with counsel at the trial stage, this nor anything else (including the Constitution)
gave the defendant the right to have long-hand evidence for appeal. The court held that
the Constitutional requirements of a fair trial were complied with at the trial stage,
and after the trial stage it was within the sound discretion of the trial court as to whether
counsel will be appointed or long-hand transcripts supplied.
15. 209 Ind. 25, 30, 31, 197 N.E. 912 (1935). The court also stated that "under
the statutes and the decisions of this court a transcript of the evidence heard upon the
trial is not necessary to present every question of alleged error which may be urged
upon an appeal from the judgment of a trial court in a proceeding."
16. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-3511 (Burns 1946). "Poor persons-Court may order
transcript.-Any person desiring to appeal to the Supreme Court or Appellate Court
of this state from the decision of any circuit court or criminal court, or the judge
thereof, in criminal cases, and not having sufficient means to procure the longhand
manuscript or transcript of the evidence taken in shorthand, by the order or permission
of any of said courts, or the judge thereof, the court or the judge thereof shall direct
the shorthand notes of evidence into longhand, as soon thereafter as practicable, and
deliver the same to such poor person: Provided, The Court or the judge thereof is
satisfied that such poor person has not sufficient means to pay said reporter for making
said longhand manuscript or transcript of evidence, and such reporter may charge such
compensation as is allowed by law in such cases for making and furnishing said longhand
manuscript, which service of said reporter shall be paid by the court or judge thereof
out of the proper county treasury."
17. State ex rel. Ward v. Porter Circuit Court, 234 Ind. 573, 575, 130 N.E.2d 136,
137 (1955). "The remedy for refusal of a trial court to furnish a poor person with a
transcript of the evidence is the application to this court for an order of mandate to
the trial court."
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the trial court to provide the petitioner with a transcript for appeal if
a proper showing were made. State ex rel. Ward v. Porter Circuit Court
is a landmark case for Indiana because the court clearly sets out what
the appellant must show to the trial court to obtain pauper aid:
To establish his right to such relief appellant must not only show
to the trial court (1) that he does not have sufficient means to
procure a transcript but he must also show (2) that the merits
of the questions to be raised on appeal cannot be considered
without a transcript of the evidence, (3) that questions of error
were presented to the trial court in his motion for a new trial
by which this court could review the merits of the cause on
appeal.1
8
In the Ward case the defendant was provided with counsel at the trial
because of his indigency. The trial court, however, would not furnish
him with a transcript with which to effect an appeal even though the
defendant was immediately incarcerated after his trial. The supreme
court in holding for the defendant stated that,
If he was without funds with which to employ counsel and to
conduct his defense at the trial, and there has been no change in
his financial status since the trial, it may reasonably be inferred
that, being confined to jail and unable to work since his trial,
he would not have sufficient funds to procure a transcript of the
evidence for use in the appeal of his case, there being nothing
to the contrary in the record .... "
In a case decided in 195820 the court affirmed the proposition that the
petitioner makes out a prima facie case for pauper aid when he follows
the requirements set out by the court in the Ward case.
18. Id. at 576, 130 N.E.2d at 138. The court further held that, "Upon a proper
showing of these matters the trial court is required by the terms of the statute (IND.
ANN STAT. § 4-3511) to order the court reporter to prepare a transcript of the evidence
for the use of the defendant on appeal, and place upon the county the legal duty to pay
the cost thereby incurred."
19. Id. at 577, 130 N.E.2d at 138.
20. State ex rel. Grecco v. Allen Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 571, 153 N.E.2d 914 (1958).
See also State ex rel. Nicholas v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 162 N.E.2d 445,
448 (Ind. 1959). "Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which may be issued by this court
only to compel the performance of a clear and absolute duty. . . . Mandamus may not
be used to control judicial discretion." The court affirmed the rule of State ex rel.
Ward v. Porter Circuit Court (note 12 supra.) with a little elaboration to wit: "While
relatrix has pursued the proper remedy . . . she has, nevertheless, failed to sustain her
burden of showing that she was legally entitled to the relief sought and that it was the




Counsel for the accused is provided for by the Constitution of The
State of Indiana.2 This right to counsel, however, was limited by the
Indiana court to the trial stage only2" until the landmark decision of
State v. Hilgemann where the court for the first time held that the
right to counsel for the accused applied to appeals as well as to the trial
stage." The court accomplished this by relying on a 1920 Indiana case 2'
which was in turn concerned with the right to counsel prior to arraign-
ment. Thus, even though the Hilgemann case is considered the landmark
case in Indiana for stating the right of the indigent to have counsel
provided for him on appeal, the initial perception of the law was first
made by the court in Batchelor v. State,26 and it took the later court
twenty-one years to grasp the elastic meaning of the phrase uttered by
the court in 1920:
It has been held that a constitutional right to be heard by counsel
is not limited to the right to be heard by counsel at the trial, but
that the spirit of the provision contemplates the right of accused
to consult with counsel at every stage of the proceedings."
(Emphasis added.)
This pronouncement by the court with its subsequent extension in the
Hilgemann case made Indiana the state to follow in regard to giving
aid to the indigent upon appeal. -8
A 1958 Indiana case, State v. Allen Circuit Court,9 affirms the
Hilgemann case, and also premises its result on the statutory provisions
for appeal in Indiana." Another 1958 case appealed from the Allen
21. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (1851).
22. In re Morgan, 122 Ind. 428, 23 N.E. 863 (1890).
23. 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d 129 (1941).
24. Id. at 577, 34 N.E.2d at 131. "The Batchelor case deals with the right to counsel
before and during the trial, but the reasoning supports the view that the defendant is
entitled to have counsel to advise him and represent him on appeal."
25. Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920).
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 76, 77, 125 N.E. at 776.
28. See 33 TULANE L. Rav. 373 (1959).
29. 238 Ind. 571, 153 N.E.2d 914 (1958).
30. IND. ANN . STAT. § 9-2301 (Burns 1956). "An appeal to the Supreme
Court or to the Appellate Court, may be taken by the defendant as a matter of
right, from any judgment in a criminal action against him, in the manner and in the
cases prescribed herein; and upon the appeal, any decision of the court or intermediate
order made in the progress of the case may be reviewed." The statute's proclamation that
appeal is "a matter of right" has been given an even broader scope by the Indiana
Supreme Court in Schaaf v. State, 221 Ind. 563, 49 N.E.2d 539 (1943), which held that
the general assembly could not deny the right of appeal to the Supreme Court by a person
convicted of crime. In other words the right of appeal is a vested right provided by the
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Circuit Court, State ex rel. Grecco v. Allen Circuit Court,3a follows the
holding of the court in State v. Allen Circuit Court, referred to above.
Having dealt specifically with transcripts and counsel being pro-
vided gratis to the indigent on appeal, we have eliminated the major cost
factors of appealing a criminal conviction. Costs such as filing fees and
appeal bonds, though important, do not carry the significance of the
more expensive items and would seem to be embodied in any system
providing free transcripts and counsel. 2
PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT
To enlarge the system of aid to the indigent appellant, the Indiana
legislature enacted the Public Defender Act in 1945." A key section of
this act is found in IND. ANN. STAT. section 13-1402, which says:
Prisoners represented after time for appeal expired.-It shall be
the duty of the public defender to represent any person in any
penal institution of this state who is without sufficient property
or funds to employ his own counsel, in any matter in which
such person may assert he is unlawfully or illegally imprisoned,
after his time for appeal shall have expired. (Emphasis added.)
Along with this key section, a subsequent section sets out the right of
the public defender to procure a transcript of the trial.
Transcripts of proceedings-Authority to stipulate facts.-The
public defender may order on behalf of any prisoner he repre-
sents a transcript of any court proceeding, including evidence
presented, had against any prisoner, and depositions, if neces-
sary, at the expense of the state, but the public defender shall
have authority to stipulate facts contained in the record of any
court, or the substance of testimony presented or evidence heard
Constitution. This interpretation, as will be pointed out later, is not required by the
United States Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
31. 238 Ind. 571, 575, 153 N.E.2d 914, 916 (1958). ". . . It necessarily follows from
the statutory provisions for appeal as of right, to an accused in a criminal case, that an
indigent defendant's right to be represented by counsel at public expense extends to his
prosecution of an appeal."
32. Filing fee-See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). Supreme Court Rule of
Ohio prevented clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court from accepting "any paper" filed
without a fee. The fee was $20. The defendant was allegedly indigent. United States
Supreme Court held that a state violated Fourteenth Amendment of Federal Consti-
tution by requiring an indigent to pay a filing fee before permitting him to file a
motion for leave to appeal in one of its courts. Appeal bond-See Barber v. Gladden,
210 Ore. 46, 298 P.2d 986 (1956). Supreme Court of Oregon held that Griffim requires
the state to assume cost of an appeal bond for an indigent appellant.
33. InD. ANN. STAT. §§ 13-1401 to 13-1406 (Burns 1956).
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involving any issue to be presented on behalf of any prisoner,
without the same being fully transcribed.34
The question then arises as to how the Indiana courts have interpreted
the Public Defender Act. In the year following the enactment of the
Public Defender Act, the supreme court in State ex rel. Fulton v.
Schannen held that "The defender may, with the consent of the court,
appear as amicus curiae, even over relator's objection... .. "" In this
case the relator sent a petition for writ of error coram nobis from prison
to Judge Schannen. Judge Schannen thereupon forwarded it to the
Attorney General who in turn submitted it to the public defender. Though
the court held that the public defender may appear as amicus curiae, the
court also recognized that the public defender could not "be forced upon"
the relator." The court then went further to state that "the prison doors"
will not be opened to any indigent to conduct coram nobis proceedings in
person "on claims which he is not willing to submit to a skilled attorney
paid by the State."37 The court's position is logical. If a prisoner has a
meritorious appeal it would behoove him to permit trained counsel to
handle the appeal.
Subsequent decisions of the supreme court held that where the
statutory time for appeal had expired, the public defender was the only
recourse available to take an appeal for an indigent prisoner." If the
public defender was of the opinion, after studying the trial record, that
no error existed to justify an appeal, the court would respect the public
defender's judgment and deny public aid. 9 As evidenced from these
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1405 (Burns 1956).
35. 224 Ind. 55, 58, 64 N.E.2d 798 (1946).
36. Id. at 57, 58, 64 N.E.2d at 799.
37. See note 35 supra. The court then further exemplified the public defender
system, ". . . With such representation the convict gains, not only the benefit of com-
petent counsel, but also, at state expense, when the Public Defender deems advisable,
transcripts necessary for appeal. Without such representation he limits his evidence in
the hearing to such affidavits as he may obtain from his place of imprisonment and he
may be present at the hearing only upon order made in the sound discretion of the judge."
38. Mooney v. State, 157 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1959) ; Parsons v. State, 238 Ind. 446,
151 N.E.2d 298 (1958) ; Theede v. Davis, 237 Ind. 702, 146 N.E.2d 246 (1957) ; Harris
v. State, 235 Ind. 700, 132 N.E.2d 617 (1956) ; Adams v. State, 233 Ind. 555, 121 N.E.2d
877 (1954) ; State v. Murray, 231 Ind. 74, 106 N.E.2d 911 (1952) ; State e.x rel. Lee v.
Wilson, 225 Ind. 640, 77 N.E.2d 354 (1948) ; State v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 375, 75 N.E.2d
551 (1947).
39. In Jackson v. Reeves, 238 Ind. 708, 709, 153 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1958), the court
said, "Obviously the public defender could not and should not be required to appeal all
cases in which inmates of our penal institutions consider that error was committed in
their respective cases. Therefore, of necessity he must be granted wide discretion as to
whether the matters complained of present any appealable issue." Accord, Anderson v.
State, 238 Ind. 708, 153 N.E.2d 603 (1958) ; Anderson v. State, 236 Ind. 700, 139 N.E.2d
197 (1957); State v. Murray, 231 Ind. 74, 106 N.F_2d 911 (1952) ; In re Kretchmer,
224 Ind. 559, 69 N.E.2d 598 cert. denied sub. nora., 329 U.S. 797 (1946).
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decisions, the public defender possesses broad discretionary powers largely
generated because of necessity-necessity in the sense that there are so
many indigent inmates and so few public defenders. A brief look at the
statutory requirements before a public defender can be appointed in a
given area will illustrate the point.
The Public Defender Act as passed in 1945 was defective because it
failed to provide for assistants to the public defender.4" The legislature
rectified this in 1951."' The Act as passed in 1951 stated in part "The
judge of the criminal court or any division thereof in the counties having
a population of four hundred thousand (400,000) or more . . . is hereby
authorized to appoint one or more public defenders, as he may deem
necessary. . . ." The 1950 census showed Marion County was the
only eligible county.
In 1953 the legislature enlarged the appointment powers as follows:
Appointment.-The judge of the circuit court in counties
having a population of not less than one hundred ten thousand
(110,000) and not more than one hundred and seventy-five
thousand (175,000) . . . is hereby authorized to appoint a
public defender ... "
A 1959 amendment of the 1953 act set the population limits at not less
than one hundred thousand (100,000) and not more than one hundred
and seventy-five thousand (175,000)." Counties within these require-
ments, according to 1950 census, are Madison, Vanderburgh and Vigo.
Therefore, a total of four counties (Marion, Madison, Vanderburgh
and Vigo) are provided with powers to appoint public defenders at state
expense.
In summation, the public defender system in Indiana is available
to all indigent inmates desiring to appeal, and it is the only recourse for
an indigent appellant after the statutory time for appeal has run. The
prisoner must be an indigent, and he must present a meritorious case for
appeal. This determination of merit is made by the public defender
himself and here the court allows broad discretion.44
The Indiana system would appear to be grounded on the theory
of justice for all, and Indiana's leadership in this area among the states
has frequently been acknowledged in the past. Leadership or prominence,
40. IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1404 (Burns 1956).
41. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-2316 (Burns Supp. 1959).
42. INn. ANN. STAT. § 9-3501 (Burns 1956).
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3501 (Burns Supp. 1959).
44. This broad discretion exercised by the Public Defender is a point of issue in
the McCrary case.
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however, are subject to decadence in a stagnant climate. Changing po-
litical, economic and social attitudes constantly serve as a challenge to
man-made laws. The United States Supreme Court has monitored these
attitudes diligently in recent years as is evidenced by its numerous de-
cisions embodying new principles and demands upon existing laws."
These decisions must be studied to ferret out and repeal or adjust exist-
ing laws which are not compatible. Indiana may well face this task as a
result of the McCrary decision. The magnitude of this task will be
evident after a study of the United States Supreme Court decisions in two
recent cases-Griffin v. Illinois" and Eskridge v. Washington Prison
Bd.47
THE GRIFFIN CASE AND STATE LAW
The petitioners in the Griffin case were convicted of armed robbery
by an Illinois court. They then petitioned the trial court for a certified
copy of the entire record including a stenographic transcript of the pro-
ceedings, to be furnished without cost, to be used for an appeal. The
petitioners alleged poverty. The petition was denied. Subsequently, after
higher state court affirmance, the United States Supreme Court received
the case. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Griffin case in
a precedent making decision and held that once a state sets up an
appellate system, it cannot discriminate against some defendants because
of their poverty; and if a transcript is necessary to provide adequate and
effective appellate review to indigent defendants, the state must provide
one.
A question now arises as to the scope and general importance of the
Griffin decision. Briefly stated, the answer would seem to be that the
Court has pronounced that poverty should not be a bar to the constitu-
tional rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court
made this plain:
To deny adequate review to the poor means that many of them
may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust con-
45. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school segregation case
holding that racial classification is per se irrational) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) (a political party which was given a special place in the state's electoral system
could not, consistent with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, discriminate
against Negroes); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and NLRB v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (key decisions under the Commerce Clause
that resulted in expansion of federal authority to deal with the nation's economic
problems.)
46. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
47. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
48. Willcox and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and Fourteenth Amendment,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957).
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victions which appellate courts would set aside. . . . There can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has.4"
The Court has seemingly elevated the poor man to the plateau occupied
by the rich man before the throne of justice. Comprehending the import-
ance of the Griffin decision is not difficult. The problem for the states
is to ascertain the scope of the decision so as to determine its effect
on their existing laws. Since the Griffin case was specifically concerned
with transcripts, this seems to be a fine way to enter the area.
The states at the time of the Griffin decision (April 23, 1956)
could be divided into four groups with regard to furnishing transcripts
on appeal :0
Free transcripts to:
1. All defendants in all criminal cases. (six (6) states.)
2. All indigent defendants convicted of any criminal offense.
(twenty-seven (27) states-Indiana included.)
3. All indigent defendants convicted of a capital offense.
(eight (8) states-Illinois included.)
4. No defendants in any criminal proceeding.
(seven (7) states.)
Plainly, the decision in the Griffin case directly affects the states in
groups three and four as far as providing transcripts on appeal."r
The Supreme Court's emphasis on "adequate and effective appellate
review," 2 however, would imply that the indigent appellant should also
be provided with counsel. 3 Nevertheless the Court did not refer to the
counsel problem in its opinion. If the Griffin case should stand for more
than mere provision of free transcripts, 4 then the states in groups one and
49. See note 46 supra at 19.
50. See Note, The Effect of Griffin v. Illinois on the State's Administration of
the Crinzal Law, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 161, 162, 163 (1957).
51. After the Griffin decision, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a new rule of
court on June 19, 1956: I1. Supreme Court Rule 65-1 as amended, S.H.A. ch. 110, §
101.65-1. "Any person sentenced to imprisonment" who is "without financial means with
which to obtain the transcript of the proceedings at his trial" will be furnished with the
same if "necessary to present fully the errors recited in the petition. .. ."
52. Majority in 351 U.S. 20. "We do not hold, however, that Illinois must purchase
a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it. The Supreme
Court may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to
indigent defendants."
53. Oaks, Tie Effect of Griffin v. Illinois on the State's Administration of the
Criminal Law, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, p. 13 Bx. 308, May 1957.
54. Willcox and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 23 (1957). "There is a probability that the Griffin decision
will eventually be construed to require a state to furnish reasonably competent council
to all indigent persons accused of serious crimes."
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two, with the exception of Indiana," are presented with a problem. Two
of the states in group two, New York and Oregon, have recently en-
countered the free counsel for an appeal problem.
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Kalan0 held that a
failure to appoint counsel for an indigent appellant violated the New
York Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The
court did not cite the Griffin case. In 1958, however, the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Breslin57 held that the Griffin decision
did not require appointment of counsel in every case, 8 and when a copy of
the trial minutes is made available to the defendant and to the court to
which he takes his appeal, he has received all the constitutional protection
to which he is entitled. Finally in 1959 the Court of Appeals in People v.
Pitts,"0 a case which had similar facts to those presented in People
v. Kalcn, followed the Kalan case, and relied on the Griffin case as
authority for the proposition that once a state sets up an appellate system,
a defendant must be afforded adequate and effective appellate review. The
Kalan and Pitts decisions hinged on the fact that the indigent defendant
was "physically unable to inspect the minutes of the trial"6 because he
was incarcerated at the time he was taking the appeal. The court held
". . .in situation where a destitute defendant is physically unable to
inspect the record on file . . . the assignment of counsel on his appeal
is required in order to make certain that that task is performed for him." 1
The court's reason for this decision was that "there is no statutory or
constitutional provision by which we may make available to the destitute
a copy of the trial minutes free of charge."62 On the basis of the Kalan
and Pitts decisions, the New York Court of Appeals cannot be said to
be extending the Griffin case to cover aid of counsel in every case. The
court in these two cases is appointing counsel to accomplish a task because
the court has no alternative-physical prevention from taking an appeal
would seem to be a clear case of violation of equal protection. From the
position the court has taken in Kalan, Breslin and Pitts it is apparent
that counsel aid to an indigent on appeal is not deemed by the New York
court to be a requisite extension of the Griffin case.
55. State v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d 129 (1951) (Indiana allows
indigent counsel for a timely appeal); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1402 (Burns Replacement
1956) (public defender available where appeal by indigent is not timely.)
56. 159 N.Y.S.2d 480, 140 N.E.2d 357 (1957).
57. 172 N.Y.S.2d 157, 149 N.E.2d 85 (1958).
58. Accord, 1959 DuKE L.J. 484 (1959). Contra, 23 ALBANY L. REV. 114 (1959).
59. 189 N.Y.S.2d 650, 160 N.E.2d 523 (1959).
60. Id. at 654, 160 N.E.2d at 525.
61. Id. at 654, 160 N.E.2d at 526.
62. Id. at 654, 160 N.E.2d at 525.
NOTES
The Oregon Supreme Court, with two judges dissenting, ruled
against counsel aid to an indigent in State v. Delaney. 3 The court
recognized its discretionary power to appoint counsel but wished to survey
the transcript first before exercising this power in an apparent attempt
to eliminate frivolous appeals.64 The Oregon Legislature in 1959 rem-
edied the problem by enacting the Post Conviction Hearing Act."3 The
Oregon Law Review, in a very cogent comment on the statute, has said:
Sec. 23 of this act provides that an indigent defendant in a
criminal action, as well as a petitioner in a post conviction pro-
ceeding, who wishes to pursue an appeal may present a timely
request to the circuit court from which the appeal would be
taken to appoint counsel to represent him on such appeal. This
request shall include a brief financial statement by the de-
fendant. If the circuit court finds that the defendant is without
funds to employ counsel on appeal, it shall appoint such counsel.
Section 23 also provides that the circuit court may determine a
reasonable fee for counsel on appeal."
This pronouncement by the Oregon legislature would seem to be in char-
acter with the overall meaning of the Griffin case. 7 The Court's not
mentioning the counsel problem in its opinion in the Griffin case can be
explained by the fact that this point was not in issue. It is reasonable to
expect that without too much time passing the Supreme Court will be
faced squarely with the counsel problem.8 The result should be in har-
mony with the Griffin decision's mandate of adequate and effective
appellate review-i.e., free counsel for the indigent appellant.
Although a State may be required to provide the indigent appellant
with the "elements" essential for an adequate review, 9 the States should
be able to maintain discretionary powers to obviate the taking of frivolous
63. 332 P.2d 71 (1958).
64. 38 ORE. L. REV. 281 (1959).
65. ORE. LAWS 1959, c. 636.
66. See note 64 supra at 282.
67. 351 U. S. 18. "There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would
deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively
denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough
to pay the costs in advance." (Emphasis added.)
68. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). The Court has recently encountered
the "filing fee" problem and held that the State could not bar the gates for
appellate review to an indigent unable to pay $20 filing fee.
69. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (Citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684 (1894).) The Court, however, did recognize "that a State is not required by
the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review
at all." 351 U.S. 18. However, "All of the States now provide some method of
appeal from criminal convictions. .. ."
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appeals."' This discretionary power brings up a further problem of what
person or institution can exercise this discretion.
In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.," the United States Supreme
Court settled the issue that the discretion cannot be lodged in the trial
court. The Court held that "The conclusion of the trial judge that there
was no reversible error in the trial cannot be an adequate substitute for
the right to full appellate review available to all defendants-who can
afford the expense of a transcript."72 In other words the trial judge
cannot have the final word as to the presence or absense of error in the
trial, or as to the merit of a defendant's case.
Analogous to a trial court rendering a final determination as to
whether the indigent appellant's appeal has merit is the procedure em-
ployed in the Public Defender system. Although giving such broad
discretion to the public defender is not subject to the same evil the
Supreme Court was striking at in Eskridge," a real question might arise
as to whether or not Eskridge could be extended so as to eliminate this
discretion even as to the public defender unless it is subject to review.
As has been previously discussed, the Indiana Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Public Defender Act as clothing the public defender with
broad discretion in ascertaining the merit of a prisoner's case for appeal."
The Act does not expressly require this interpretation." The limited
number of public defenders allowed by the statute,76 however, necessitates
this Indiana Supreme Court interpretation because the Act does not
70. 351 U.S. 24. Justice Frankfurter in concurring opinion, "When a State
not only gives leave for appellate correction of trial errors but must pay for the
cost of its exercise by the indigent, it may protect itself so that frivolous appeals
are not subsidized and public moneys not needlessly spent." (Emphasis added.)
71. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
72. Id. at 216.
73. It would seem that the Court was striking at a system which would allow
the trial judge to determine whether or not he had committed error at the trial.
The Court was merely re-applying the old adage that "no man should be the
judge of his own cause." It would indeed be a remarkable occurrence when ajudge could deny a defendant's motion for a new trial and in the same breath
determine that the case had sufficient merit for appeal to justify the expense
and administrative burden involved in furnishing the indigent with a transcript
and counsel for an appeal. The public defender, on the other hand, is not in this
apparent position of conflict of interest; and his exercise of discretion in deter-
mining the merit of an indigent's case may well be justified and proper.
74. See Jackson v. Reeves, supra note 39.
75. IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1402 (Burns 1956). "It shall be the duty of the public
defender to represent any person in any penal institution of this state who is without
sufficient property or funds to employ his own counsel, in any matter in which such
person may assert he is unlawfully or illegally imprisoned, after his time for appeal shall
have expired."
76. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3501 (Burns Supp. 1959).
NOTES
merely provide for free transcripts17 but also for free counsel." If the
Indiana Supreme Court did not allow the public defender broad discretion
in the determination of the merit of an appeal, the indigent prisoners with
meritorious cases would not be afforded the justice contemplated by the
Act. The public defender would waste valuable time and money advocat-
ing cases with little or no merit. Thus it would appear that Eskridge does
not and should not remove all discretion in the area of determining the
merit of a case for appeal.
CONCLUSION
In light of the possible weaknesses in the Indiana Public Defender
system it seems that changes may have to be made. If these changes
become necessary, they should conform to the holdings of the United
States Supreme Court in the Griffin 9 and Eskridge" cases. Taken
together, these decisions seem to contemplate a system consisting of these
elements: First, if the indigent defendant desires to take an appeal, he
should at the expense of the state, be provided with a free transcript
upon a showing to the trial court, that he is a poor person, and that the
merits of his case cannot be brought before the reviewing court without
a transcript. Second, a test ascertaining the merit of his case may possibly
be employed with the indigency test, if the decision of "no merit" by the
public defender is subject to review by the state supreme court. The
inclusion of a merit test without the right to review by the high court
may well come within the proscription of the Eskridge case. Adjusting
Indiana's Public Defender system to conform to the above requirements,
however, does not dispose of all the problems. The financial burden of an
extensive program of providing free transcripts to indigents can be
great,8 and Indiana should make a realistic appraisal of its present
transcript requirements in an attempt to cut costs.8" As presently set up
by the Public Defender Act, the public defender is allowed to procure
stipulated facts in taking an appeal.83 There are also other methods
77. IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1405 (Burns 1956).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1402 (Burns 1956).
79. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
80. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
81. Dean, Proposal Ride for Hearing of Appeals on Original Papers, 8
F.R.D. 143, 148 (1958). "Premising my calculations on 100 cases, the statistics of
my office show that the average number of pages in transcripts of records, under
the present Rules, is 260, and the average cost of same under the present Rules is
$104. Under the proposed Rule the average cost of a record on appeal should
average not more than $4. The savings to litigants in these 100 cases would
therefore be about $10,000." See also 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 934 (1958).
82. This entire problem is comprehensively surveyed in the article: Wilcox,
Karlen and Roemer, Justice Lost, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 934 (1958).
83. IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1405 (Burns Replacement 1956).
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which may be utilized to decrease the cost of transcripts on appeal.
First, the amount of written material given to the appellate court
could be reduced by substituting the question and answer record for the
narrative record.84
Second, the use of original papers on appeal would constitute a
substantial savings.5 The Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit
adopted a new set of Rules effective July 1, 1956.6 One of the new Rules
sets up the use of original papers." Other changes are as follows:
"(1) the use of a printed record is eliminated and appropriate record
material is presented in an appendix to the brief on appeal and by other
methods; . . . and (3) alternative reproduction methods, other than
conventional letter press printing, are authorized for both appendices
and briefs."8
The savings derived from any scheme to alter the transcript require-
ments must be balanced by the possibility that justice may be thwarted
because of an inadequate transcript. The quality of justice must not be
disturbed.
84. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA, 178 (1939).
85. Dean, op. cit. supra note 81 at 148. ". . . The primary purpose of this
proposed Rule is to save expense to litigants." See note 81 supra.
86. Belknap, The New Rides of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
45 ILL. B.J. 74 (1956). The rules were designed to accomplish two major objec-
tives: "(1) making the process of taking an appeal from a District Court less
expensive and (2) expediting the time within which a case being appealed to the
court can be finally submitted for decision."
87. F.C.A. Rules c. 10 Court of Appeals, Seventh Cir. Rule 12 (e)-"Trans-
mission of Record on Appeal. Promptly after notice of appeal is filed in the
district court . . . the clerk of the district court shall transmit to the clerk of this
court all the original papers in the file dealing with the action or proceeding in
which the appeal is taken, with the exception of such omissions as are agreed upon
by written stipulation of the parties on file ..
88. See note 86 supra.
